Human rights law expert Dr Adam Fletcher says coronavirus tracing apps could endanger our rights, but the benefit may outweigh that risk.
The Australian Government has announced its intention to roll out an app which alerts you to possible contact with anyone who has (a) installed the same app and (b) been diagnosed COVID-19.
This is intended to be a discussion of the human rights implications of the app rather than the technicalities, but briefly speaking, it will likely use Bluetooth ‘beacon’ technology built into most recentsmartphones to exchange code between phones which come into proximity. The data will likely be encrypted and stored only on people’s phones temporarily, unless they are diagnosed with COVID-19, in which case their data will be uploaded to a central database.
Australians are likely to have several questions about such an app, which potentially poses a number of human rights concerns, including with respect to privacy and misuse of information. The leading technology frameworks which could enable the app to function come from BlueTrace and a joint venture between Apple and Google. Both solutions describe themselves as ‘privacy preserving’, and indeed for most users that could be an appropriate description, but the devil will be in the detail of how the app is implemented by Government.
Where did the idea/technology behind the app come from?
There is much buzz in the tech community at the moment about the new framework being developed by tech titans Google and Apple. It is Bluetooth Low Energy Beacon-based, and is intended to facilitate the development of contact-tracing apps around the world. Some technical documentation for it has just been made available. However, the main operational feature of this framework (the API) is not due be released until some time in May, and the Australian Government has said it plans to move faster than that. Minister Stuart Robert confirmed on Friday that the Government is not working with Google and Apple. BHRIGHT will be tracking the app closely (excuse the pun) and assessing the business and human rights implications.
The Singapore Government rolled out an app called TraceTogether (based on a home-grown version of the Apple/Google framework developed by the Government Technology Agency) last month, which is the inspiration behind the current proposal. Although it has been considered successful from both technical and public response viewpoints, its penetration has been estimated at around 20%. In addition, the TraceTogether website is somewhat equivocal on whether citizens will be compelled to upload their data to a central government database once diagnosed with COVID-19.
On a more positive note, the Singapore Government is making the code behind its app open source, which should be considered best practice from an accountability perspective. Israel has also gone down this path, and the Australian Government has said it will do likewise.
Is it likely to put my rights at risk?
One of the initial questions Australians are likely to have about an app such as this is whether it enables the Government to track your location. The way it operates in Singapore, it does not. However, Android (as opposed to iOS) users need to be aware that it will ask for permission to access the location of your phone anyway, due to a Google policy decision to bundle Bluetooth and Location permissions.
One of the greatest concerns with an app like this is that it may enable tracking beyond the scope of the current crisis, for commercial and/or security purposes. As with other tools of interest to police and security agencies – the federal metadata retention regime comes to mind – there could be ‘mission creep’ to enable enforcement agencies to use uploaded data to examine your (real-world) social network. Updates to an app which many may keep installed after the current crisis could enable all kinds of extra capabilities.
De-anonymising data uploaded by those diagnosed with COVID-19 is also a possibility, and the Australian Government has had serious issues with this in the past, especially in relation to census data. If the app were to adopt some of the Apple/Google encryption technology in the future, this would become a relatively difficult endeavour. Be that as it may, it is worth considering what those with the technical capabilities and ill intent may stand to gain from such an endeavour. If there is a potential commercial or political payoff, someone is sure to attempt it. Note that the Singapore version of the app also collects anonymised analytics data, which presents another risk factor.
Does the Government have a duty to protect my rights in developing this app? |
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