Foreign interference

In a university context, foreign interference can manifest in the form of undue influence over campus activities, threats to academic freedom, harassment and intimidation, or unwanted technology transfer.

It is important to distinguish between foreign interference and foreign influence.

• All governments, including the Australian Government, seek to influence issues of importance to them.
• Foreign influence is activity that is open, transparent, respectful of our people, society and democratic systems
• Foreign influence can include diplomatic activities, political lobbying, communication activities, disbursements, and cultural diplomacy.

When conducted in an open and transparent manner, these activities are not foreign interference. 

In response to growing concerns about foreign interference, the Australian Government has enacted a series of new legislation and guidelines. 

In December 2018, the National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Act 2018 came into force. Within the same month, the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Legislation Amendment Act 2018 was released.  

In November 2019, the Guidelines to Counter Foreign Interference in the Australian University Sector (the Guidelines) were published. In November 2021, the Guidelines were refreshed to further support universities.  

The Guidelines aim to protect the university sector against foreign interference by supporting an environment of trust and guiding decision making, based on potential risks, enabling Australian universities to continue producing world-class research.  

The Guidelines focus on four key themes, each with specific objectives and best practice considerations. These themes are not intended to be exhaustive of all considerations by universities about foreign interference risks. Below is the summary of the key themes.

Due diligence involves conducting checks to provide assurance when making decisions, especially when establishing partnerships and collaborations. Identifying risks through due diligence can occur at any stage of forming a partnership. 

Working with entities whose legal systems and approaches to academic freedom and human rights differ from ours poses a higher risk of undue influence. Critical and emerging technologies are also more vulnerable to foreign interference. Unaddressed, these risks can negatively impact individuals, universities, and even Australia’s economic, social and national interests.

The Australian Government outlines requirements that researchers need to consider when collaborating internationally in specific areas or disciplines. Useful resources and reference sites include:

• List of Critical Technologies in the National Interest
• Due Diligence Assistance Framework
• Guidance for developing and undertaking open source searches
• DFAT Consolidated List
• Defence Export Controls (DEC)

Foreign interference poses a threat to academic freedoms in Australian universities and education providers. Foreign governments may attempt to influence academics by redirecting their research or stealing intellectual property for military or commercial gain. They may also seek to covertly shape university curriculums and monitor or intimidate international students. This interference can manifest in several ways:

• Applying economic pressure on universities to enter into unfavourable agreements that grant intellectual property rights and economic benefits predominantly to foreign entities.
• Influencing academic inquiry, discourse, research topics, or course content to align with foreign interests.
• Silencing freedom of speech and expression on campus when views challenge those of a foreign government

The Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme commenced on 10 December 2018. The Scheme aims to provide the public with visibility of the nature, level and extent of foreign influence on Australia's government and politics. 

Broadly speaking, any person is required to register if: 

• They undertake registrable activities or enter into a registrable arrangement, and 
• The activity is, or will be undertaken in Australia on behalf of a foreign principal, and 
• The activity is undertaken for the purpose of political or governmental influence, and 
• No exemptions apply. 

A foreign principal includes: 

• A foreign government 
• A foreign political organisation 
• A foreign government related entity 
• A foreign government related individual. 

Registrable activities include: 

• Parliamentary lobbying 
• General political lobbying 
• Communications activities 
• Disbursement activity (payment of money or things of value). 

Whether an activity is registrable depends on a combination of factors: 

• The identity of the person undertaking the activity 
• The identity of the foreign principal 
• The nature of the relationship between the foreign principal and the person undertaking the activity, and 
• The nature and purpose of the activity.

If your work involves a foreign academic, organisation, institution or government, you may need to register under the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme (FITS). To comply, you may need to register your activity or arrangement with the Australian Government. 

Not all foreign engagements need to be registered, but there are some relationships which the Australian Government believes must be declared and made transparent to the Australian community. Registration of activities or arrangements identified under the Scheme safeguards the national interest. 

Your need to register will be determined by the nature and purpose of: 

• The activity or the arrangement - and whether it has the intent or potential to influence a government or political decision; and 
• The foreign entity or person - and whether it is considered a "foreign principal" under the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act. 

Registration does not mean that you have to change what you are doing. It just means that there will be a public record of your engagement and you will satisfy your legal obligation to be up front about the purpose of any relevant foreign relationships. 

Additional FITS resources are available on website of the Attorney-General's Department. 

Foreign interference on university campuses can involve attempts by foreign powers seeking to improperly influence course content, research directions, and the actions of staff and students. This interference can originate from multiple countries and affect both domestic and international students and staff. The UFIT Guidelines adopt a country-agnostic approach to build resilience against all forms of foreign interference. 

Impacts on campus culture may include: 

• Threats, intimidation, or harassment of students and staff, both online and in person 
• Online disinformation campaigns via social media 
• Stalking and unwanted physical or electronic surveillance 
• Censorship or self-censorship to avoid harassment or being reported to a foreign government 
• Coercion through threatening or intimidating family or friends overseas 
• Attempts to covertly influence how topics are perceived, including interference with discussion on campus. 

Detecting foreign interference can be challenging due to its deceptive and clandestine nature.  Some indicators of foreign interference include:  

• Coordinated bullying or harassment based on political or ideological topics  
• Threatening or intimidating conduct targeted toward a particular group of people 
• Attempts to gather sensitive or personal information  
• Concealing relationships or interactions  
• Pressure to influence others to adopt a particular position. 

Foreign interference can have profound impacts on university staff and students, and enduring impacts on university culture and reputation. The impact on universities may include:  

• Risks to physical and mental health of students and staff  
• Damage to the university’s ability to provide a safe and welcoming environment for students and staff  
• Compromised academic freedom and freedom of speech, hindering the ability to deliver open and critical education, and  
• Reputational risks to the university.

Responses to foreign interference should focus on reducing the ability of foreign actors to undertake these activities, rather than targeting or stigmatising individuals or groups based on nationality. Actions that result in racism or negative sentiment are counter-productive to maintaining a collaborative campus culture and Australian values. By maintaining welcoming and inclusive Australian campuses, we can effectively counter racial discrimination and celebrate the contributions of international students and staff. 

For any questions or to report concerns about foreign interference, please contact the Central Compliance team at foreign.risk@rmit.edu.au.